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DEEDS-RIGHTS IN STREETS INCORPORATED
BY REFERENCE
Recent years have disclosed an increase in sub-developing and large scale
conveyancing. This fact necessitates a greater understanding of a sale which
incorporates by reference a plat or map. When a deed refers to a plat or
map the sale creates certain rights and duties with regard to the streets on the
plat. Pennsylvania law in this area is well established, but, nevertheless, quite
confusing. This confusion is caused by the use of terminology which at first
blush appears to be not only inconsistent, but contradictory. Another factor
is the intertwining of public and private rights which result from incorporating
a plat. It seems that both history and logic have played their separate parts
in creating such a state of confusion.
Where land is sold by reference to a plat the purchaser acquires certain
rights in all the streets thereon. A purchaser can reasonably infer under these
circumstances that the grantor intended to give certain rights and assume certain
duties in regard to these streets. These rights are said to arise as a result
of an implied covenant.1 An incorporation of these streets in the deed not only
affects the purchase price, but it is a representation by the grantor that such
streets will be available for use by the grantee and the public forever. The
same effect is given to such a representation as would be given to a written
statement in the deed.'
The grantor has covenanted not to interfere with the use of the streets
by the grantee and the public forever. Although this is only one covenant
it has a dual effect. The first is to vest in the grantee a right to use these
streets without the grantor's interference.4 Courts often refer to this right
in the grantee as an appurtenant easement in the streets arising from the implied
covenant.5 It may seem inconsistent to have an easement arise from a mere
covenant, but there is case law to the effect that a grant of an easement may
result from the making of a covenant, if the nature of the right given by the
covenant is similar to a recognized easement. However, some Pennsylvania
IE.g., Chambersburg Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Cumberland Valley R.R. Co., 240 Pa. 519, 87 At. 968
(1913); Cox's Inc. v. Snodgrass, 272 Pa. 148, 92 A.2d 540 (1952); Titusville Amusement Co.
v. Titusville Iron Works, 286 Pa. 561, 134 Atd. 481 (1926).
2 O'Donnell v. Pittsburgh, 234 Pa. 401, 83 At. 314 (1912); Quicksall v. Philadelphia, 177
Pa. 301, 135 At. 609 (1896).
3 McCall v. Davis, 56 Pa. 431 (1867).
4 Chambersburg Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Cumberland Valley R.R. Co., supra note 1; O'Donnell v.
Pittsburgh, supta note 2.
5 Ibid.
a Horn v. Miller, 136 Pa. 640, 20 At. 706 (1890); Stanislaus Water Co. v. Bachman, 152
Cal. 716, 93 Pac. 858 (1908).
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decisions have avoided this problem by holding that a reference creates an im-
plied covenant or an implied grant.'
The other effect of such a covenant is that the grantor makes an offer of
dedication to the public.8 Exactly why a covenant to a grantee results in a
dedication to the public is quite difficult to justify. Tiffany, in his work on
the law of real property, offers this explanation:
The doctrine had its origin, it may be suspected, in a failure to distinguish
between the rights of the individual purchaser and of the public, the courts say-
ing, as they not infrequently do, that a sale of lots with reference to a plat in-
volves a dedication of the lots in favor of the purchasers and ignoring the well-
settled principle that land cannot be dedicated for the benefit of particular
members of the public. The expression "dedication" having thus been in-
troduced to express the result of such sales in favor of individuals, it was to
be expected that as time went on, such sales should come to be regarded as
effecting a dedication for all purposes. 9
It has been stated that the grantor's implied covenant creates an irrevocable
tender of dedication. Originally, this offer was said to be irrevocable forever,
but the Act of 1899 limited the time period to twenty-one years under certain
situations. ° An interesting question is presented as to whether this tender is,
in fact, irrevocable. The court in Chambersburg Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Cumberland
Valley R.R. Co." said:
When streets have been thus dedicated and lots have been sold according
to the plan, it is not within the power of the grantor or anyone else to revoke
the dedication without the consent of all lot owners who purchased under an
implied covenant that the streets shall remain open for the use of the lot owners
and of the public as a means of access to their properties. 12
Hence, it appears that the offer of dedication is revocable when all lot owners
in the plat consent to the revocation in writing. This conclusion is reasonable
since the offer of dedication results from the grantor's personal covenant to the
lot owners.
When the public has accepted the dedication, one of the promises of the
covenantor has been fulfilled. However, this acceptance by the public does not
7 Chambersburg Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Cumberland Valley R.R. Co., supra note 1; Quicksall v.
Philadelphia, supra note 2.
8 Ibid.
9 4 TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY 1103 (1939).
10 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1961 (1899); where a street is not opened or used by the public
for 21 years from time of platting, it may not be opened without the permission Qf the wn:r of
the land on which it is projected.
1" 240 Pa. 519, 87 At. 968 (1913).
12 Id. at 522, 87 At. at 969,
1960.1
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
extinguish the easement the lot owners previously acquired. The court in
the Chambersburg Shoe Mfg." case said:
- The public may accept or reject the easement tendered by the owner of the
plan of lots, or having accepted may renounce the public right by a vacating
ordinance, but no act of the public authorities can operate to divest the prop-
erty rights of the lot owners resulting as a legal consequence from the implied
covenants under which they purchased. 14
When the public does accept the tender of a dedication, however, it is clear
that its rights become paramount to the right of the grantee. Further, the
grantee has no cause of action against the public authorities or the grantor
when reasonable police regulations interfere with his private right.1"
Where a lot is purchased after the public has accepted a street or streets
on the plat, Pennsylvania decisions hold that the purchaser acquires no private
right to such a street or streets." For example, in Cohen v. Simpson Real
Estate Corp. " the court said: "In such a situation there is negatived any
implied covenant that the grantee should have private rights in the streets in
addition to the rights of the public therein." 18 Therefore, in order to receive
any rights in a particular street the grantee must purchase his lot prior to a
municipal acceptance of the particular street. This does not seem logical,
however, because a reference to a street that is not accepted creates both a
tender of a dedication and a private easement. Where a street has been ac-
cepted, only the offer of dedication has been accepted, and it would seem that
a private easement should still arise from the sale. It would appear that the
effects brought about as a result of incorporation by reference are so intercon-
nected that it is impossible to separate the dual aspects of the covenant.
An entirely different situation exists where the grantor makes a reference
to an abutting street which is projected on his land by a municipality." The
covenant which arises in this instance has but one effect and that is to give
the grantee a private easement in the entire bed of the unopened street. If
the municipality abandons its right to open the street, the grantee's easement
is limited to one of necessity. Whereas if the street is in fact opened, the
13 240 Pa. 519, 87 Atd. 968 (1913).
14Id. at 522, 87 Atl. at 969.
15 Gailey v. Wilkinsburg Real Estate & Trust Co., 283 Pa. 381, 129 Atd. 445 (1925).
16 Cox's Inc. v. Snodgrass, supra note 1; Titusville Amusement Co. v. Titusville Iron Works,
supra note 1.
17 385 Pa. 352, 123 A.2d 715 (1956).
18 Id. at 357, 123 A.2d at 718.
19 Hawkes v. Philadelphia, 264 Pa. 346, 107 At. 745 (1919).
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grantee acquires a right as a member of the general public to use the street.
In describing this unusual situation the court in Hawkes v. Philadelphia" said:
Such act is in no sense a dedication, nor does the owner covenant that
the municipality shall in the future open that street. The lot is sold subject to
a possible relinquishment, by the municipality, of its right to open; but if it does
open the street for public use, there can be no doubt that, whatever covenant
springs from the conveyance of a lot bounded by a municipally plotted street,
is executed when the street is actually opened as a street. 21
As a reason for excluding a covenant to dedicate such a street to the public the
courts assert the fact that the street was not placed on the plat by the grantor
but solely by the act of the city.2  The court in In re Brooklyn St." said:
But when a municipal government lays out streets upon the land of a pri-
vate citizen, it is not the act of the owner in any sense, and hence there is no
necessity for an implication of a covenant against the owner to give his land
to the public without compensation .... 24
The private easement, which arises from a reference to a municipal plotting, is
limited to the situation where the street is reasonably necessary to the enjoy-
ment of the purchaser's lot.26  In this respect there is a great difference between
a reference to a municipally plotted street and a reference to a street plotted
by the grantor. In the case of Pennsylvania Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia,"6 which
involved a street plotted by a municipality, the court said:
It cannot be said that the use of Windrim Avenue, then unopened but
plotted, was necessary to the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company. It
had the advantage of other opened streets, and the conveyed plot merely en-
larged its right-of-way. It is not likely that either party to that grant intended
that the grantee should have any easement in or right-of-way over Windrim
Avenue.27
However, it should be noted that subsequent circumstances may alter the
respective rights of the parties. An example of the effect of subsequent conduct
of the parties is the case of Gailey v. Wilkinsburg.28 In that case an easement
in a street on the plat was created by an implied covenant. Subsequently:, the
grantee used another street not on the plat for many years, and the grantor
erected a building on the first street. The court held that on the basis of estoppel
20 Ibid.
21 Id. at 350, 107 At!. at 745.
221n re Brooklyn St., 118 Pa. 640, 12 Atl. 664 (1888).
23 Ibid.
24 Id. at 646, 12 At. at 666.
25 Neely v. Philadelphia, 212 Pa. 551, 61 At!. 1096 (1905).
26 318 Pa. 209, 178 At. 129 (1935).
27 Id. at 216, 178 At!. at 132.
2
8 Supra note 15.
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the grantee lost his easement in the first street and acquired an easement in the
second street. In discussing this situation the court said:
The lot owners of course were not bound to accept the change. Nor were
they, until their rights were infringed, bound to do anything to signify their
disapproval. But after this dedication, the old way was in the actual notorious
occupation of others without protest; appellees used the new way, with the
general public, for sixteen years; the combined effect of these acts show an
acceptance of the new way in lieu of the old: 19 C. J. 973.29
Where an accepted street on the plat is later vacated by a municipality,
there may be a need for ingress to and egress from a lot. There is no doubt
that the lot holder receives an easement by necessity in that street, regardless of
when he purchased the lot or who projected the street." In this situation it
might seem that the necessity and not the reference to a plat created the ease-
ment. However, the cases indicate that a reference to this public street is an
implied covenant that the lot owner may use the street to the extent that it is
needed for ingress to and egress from his property, provided the street is
vacated. 1 Exactly how this type of easement differs from a pure easement by
necessity, other than specifying a definite route seems to be undecided at this
time.
Many jurisdictions differ from Pennsylvania as to the effect of incor-
porating by reference a street plotted by the grantor. Some of these jurisdic-
tions do not give a lot holder a right in all of the streets but only in those
streets which are reasonably necessary to the use of his property. 2 This
would seem to be the true intent of the parties. As previously pointed out,
Pennsylvania only reaches this result when reference is made to a municipally
plotted street. It seems logical that the same result should be reached with
regard to a street plotted by the grantor. Under present law it is exceedingly
difficult for a sub-developer to replot the streets should the need arise. It is
suggested that this facet of Pennsylvania law be changed, and that streets
plotted by a grantor be accorded the same treatment presently given municipal
projections. The change not only would remove the present anomaly in the
law, but it would also provide much needed encouragement to sub-developing.
DON W. LLEWELLYN.
29 283 Pa. at 390, 129 At!. at 448-449.
3o Gailey v. Wilkinsburg R.E. Trust Co., supra note 15; Hawkes v. Philadelphia supra note 19.
s1 Ibid.
32 Mullan v. Hochman, 157 Md. 213, 145 Atl. 554 (1929); Nichols Copper Co. v. Connolly,
208 App. Div. 667, 148 N.E. 720 (1924); In re New York (East 177th Street), 239 N.Y. 119,
145 N.E. 903 (1924).
[VOL. 64
